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article (D-2) épistémologie naïve et émotions épistémiques au prisme de Spinoza

Abstract : The questions dealt with in this article come from two seminars at EHESS and one seminar at Sorbonne Paris 1 followed from 2018 to 2020 as well as from the associated documentation provided by the professors : (1-) epistemic emotions of G. Origgi and A. Godber, (2-) naïve epistemology by P. Engel and J. Dokic and (3-) discrimination by M. Bessone. Excerpts from these documents are therefore mentioned in this article. Naïve epistemology is everyone's epistemology, people as they are, with their vague statements and gestures, improbable (hence our consideration of "epistemic emotions") and biased (hence our consideration of epistemic discrimination). The initial goal of this article is to reconsider the somewhat normative approach of some researchers of the people's everyday epistemology using some words and not others, not always the "right" ones according to the definition of cognitive science researchers (e.g. judicious use of a factive (I know, I see) or non-factive (I know, I think) term). It is a very strong epistemic assumption to consider that a "naïve" person masters and uses "epistemic vocabulary" judiciously. Moreover, researchers say that there is "too much" use of the term "knowledge" or that other words are "misused". In order to say "too much" or " misuse" it is necessary to situate oneself in a frame of reference, a frame of reference that allows to compare ("too much") or to classify and even judge ("misuse"). What frame of reference? And in what language? In order to consider the "naïve" epistemology of each person, our article first proposes a different frame of reference than this "epistemic vocabulary" and it is this frame of reference that is then used to qualify as belief, knowledge, intuition, imagination, etc. any understanding, idea or edifice of expressed and received ideas. In order to build this reference frame adapted to a naïve epistemology taking into account emotions and epistemic discriminations, our first premise is the hypothesis that everyone wants and is able to expose some ideas "that are more or less " about something. The objective of the researcher (but also of each one!) can be to qualify these ideas about this thing (e.g. "is it knowledge? a belief? an intuition?") then to consider the conditions of their transmission to others by mobilising our second premise. Our second premise is a two-step process: (1-) consider the "knowledge" or understanding expressed by each person and qualify them in our reference frame, then (2-) consider the perception or receptivity by others of the "knowledge" that someone expresses, "knowledge" that another person listens to, accepts to the point of being more or less inhabited by it: how are the expressed ideas perceived, qualified? what are the factors influencing perception, qualification and ultimately taken into account, and this by placing oneself in the same reference frame? Our approach and our frame of reference allow other objectives: to consider at new costs in this article the emotions and epistemic discriminations.
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https://hal-univ-evry.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03494651
Contributor : Andre Moulin Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, January 5, 2022 - 6:58:37 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, January 8, 2022 - 3:34:23 AM

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Andre Moulin. article (D-2) épistémologie naïve et émotions épistémiques au prisme de Spinoza. 2022. ⟨hal-03494651⟩

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